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ABSTRACT

Although the American political system is characterized by commitment to democracy and self-determination, the American government has traditionally taken an interest in the political development of other countries. The recent intervention of the U.S. in the political development of Southwest Africa/Namibia is an example. In the body of this paper the author reviews in detail the history of political domination by certain groups over other groups, as demonstrated by (1) the development of France as a nation from a territorial stage, (2) Ian Smith's transitional government in Rhodesia, (3) struggles among tribal groups for political control or identity in Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda, and (4) tension between ethnic groups in Guyana, Trinidad-Tobago, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka. The author concludes that the political needs of multi-ethnic countries cannot be fulfilled by unitary territorial democracy or by territorial federalism. Each group must be able to organize politically and to administer its own affairs with an equitable share of public resources. Where nationalities are intermingled, the principle of personal autonomy should be invoked, enabling the organs of each nationality to provide education, cultural facilities, and other services. In this way, political socialization can build on traditional social groups instead of destroying them. (Author/AV)

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DESIGNING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS FOR MULTI-ETHNIC COUNTRIES

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Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville

Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the Third World Conference
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DESIGNING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS FOR MULTI-ETHNIC COUNTRIES

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It may seem presumptuous for Americans to talk about political institutions for other countries, multi-ethnic or not. Our commitments to self-determination and democracy suggest that each people be left to shape its own constitution, which should be rooted in the respective culture. The political scientist, particularly the foreigner, finds it prudent to limit himself to the role of technical advisor.

Yet the fact remains that Americans, not only as private observers, but as members of Congress, as Presidents, and as Department of State officials at various levels, repeatedly make judgments about the kinds of governmental structures other peoples ought to have. United States diplomatic actions and policies often have specific impacts on constitutional developments abroad--though the result is often not precisely what was intended. Thus, the United States has intervened in the political development of South West Africa/Namibia, in concert with other powers and with Secretary-General Waldheim of the United Nations, to favor a unitary state rather than the system of autonomous homelands recommended some years ago by the Odendaal Commission or the federation worked out by the multi-racial convention in the Turnhalle.

Political Socialization and Political Structure

Because Americans have succeeded reasonably well in creating a political community within a territorial state, they often tend to assume that a political nation exists contiguous with each territory having a name and definite boundaries. Some years ago, when this writer was advising a senatorial candidate on campaigning for ethnic votes in greater Chicago, he was forced to warn his client repeatedly never to address listeners as "Czechoslovaks"--at least not if he wanted to win any Slovak votes. But the man in the street, who may well be a teacher, clergyman, or newscaster and thus in a position to project his store of information and misinformation, persists in believing that Czecho-Slovakia is full of Czechoslovaks, Namibia is the home of the Namibians, while Nigeria and Zaïre are the fatherlands of patriotic Nigerians and Zaïrois respectively--except perhaps for a few misguided separatists. Ubi territorium, ibi natio.

This brings us to the question of what is a body politic and what integrates it: the question of political socialization. Describing the beginnings of political society, John Locke (1690, paras. 95-99) tells us that a commonwealth comes into being through "the consent of any number of freemen capable of majority." In total context, "capable of majority" means that the minority on a particular issue accept being overridden because they feel a higher-priority interest in cohesion of the total society and peaceful accommodation within it. There must, in other words, be a prevailing consensus: a

feeling of belonging on the part of individuals directed more to the total community than to their particular ethnic, religious, class, caste, or other groups. Where this unifying consensus does not exist, that is, where particular loyalties or interests prevail, any viable political system must be based on accommodation among groups rather than persons. In such a case, territorial majority rule will not work and it is obtuse of Americans or other reformers to insist on it.

While few political scientists would endorse Henry Ford's dictum that "history is bunk," there is a temptation to forget historical facts vital to an understanding of contemporary nationalism in the United States, Western and Eastern Europe, and in developing countries. Even the founders of western political science, from Hobbes to Locke and Burke and from Bodin and Bossuet to Rousseau and St. Simon, yielded to this temptation in accepting as "nations" the populations living under particular governments without asking why and how this came about. The result was what Eugen Lemberg (1964, I, pp. 168-71) describes as the rational model of the nation. Essentially territorial in concept, it contained only two categories: the state and the individual. Democratic freedom consisted in liberation from particular linkages: to family, tribe, church, linguistic community, class, or occupational group. As the rational model was projected across Europe by the French Revolution and the democratic Caesarism of Napoleon I, it found its dialectical answer in the romantic idea of the nation or Volk. This concept was given definitive

form by Johann Gottfried Herder, who considered that

> all these phases of life previously considered separately and studied for their own sakes, such as language, poetry, music, law, philosophy, politics, economics, religion, etc., are expressions of a people and therefore radiations of a principle of life, which may be called the national soul, national spirit, or simply nation (Volk).
>
> The nation thus acquired the character of an individual or a personality. . . . (ibid., p. 172)

The political feelings and behavior of most Asian and African peoples correspond more closely to Herder's romantic picture than to the rational-territorial model. Kikuyu nationalism, for instance, is exemplified by the rites and rituals described by the late Jomo Kenyatta in his Facing Mount Kenya (1938), the style of which is psychologically akin to romanticism.

The historical fact modern political scientists are most inclined to ignore is the way in which European monarchs and their ministers used language as a political weapon in the process of nation-building--a precedent emulated today by President Nyerere of Tanzania (Mhina, 1974, passim.). Many are inclined to assume that France, the classic model of a unitary nation, arose spontaneously, like Venus from the deep. Actually, the French cultural nation was created through dynastic politics--à coups d'épée, as Richelieu once put it (Glaser and Possony, 1979, p. 117). France originated as a territorial state with regional dialects and even languages. Apart from the non-Latin districts where Basque, Breton, Flemish, and German were spoken, the two major linguistic regions were that of the Langue d'Oïl, containing thirty million French people today, and that of the Langue d'Oc, the

southern half of France, with a present-day population of fifteen million. Occitan had become a literary language in the eleventh century, and a state of Occitania was emerging along the Mediterranean seaboard from Nice to Barcelona. It was characterized by urbanity and tolerance, and its Jews escaped the persecution typical of the Middle Ages in much of Europe. But the Albigensian heresy gave the kings in Paris the excuse to mount a crusade and to annex the entire Occitan area east of the Pyrenees to their growing kingdom. The policy of the Capetians and their successors, the Valois and the Bourbons, was to make the speech of the Île de France, the region immediately surrounding Paris, the standard speech of the whole kingdom, at the cost of stamping out regional languages and cultures. Linguistic nation-building in Spain followed a similar pattern. National integrative forces proceeded from culturally poor but militarily efficient Castile rather than the more civilized Aragon or Andalusia (for a fuller discussion see ibid., pp. 116-19).

It was Herder's romantic concept of the linguistic-cultural nation or Volk that prevailed east of the Rhine. After being embraced by the German reformers of the Wars of Liberation, it spread to the peoples of Central Europe, and the early part of the nineteenth century witnessed a linguistic renaissance. Following the example of Jacob Grimm, who laid down the basis for modern literary German, a succession of scholars provided modern grammars for the Czech, Polish, Serbo-Croatian, Slovene, and Slovak languages. This national renaissance, as well as the

Italian risorgimento, took place without regard to political boundaries. Giuseppe Mazzini, in his"Brotherhood Pact of Young Europe," asserted that each people had its own distinctive mission rooted in its ethnicity, an idea that Pasquale Stanislao Mancini expanded to include the demand that each ethnic-linguistic nation found its own independent state (Rabl, 1963, pp. 40, 46). The slogan of ethnic independence, embraced by radical nationalists, proved disintegrative in the case of Austria-Hungary. Since the peoples of Central Europe do not live in compact and discrete regions but in interlocking and overlapping settlements, the demand for ethnic-linguistic states and its fulfillment at the end of World War I created a situation of chronic instability as well as economic stagnation (Hertz, 1947, passim.).

European experience is relevant to the Third World because nationalism in Asia and Africa, to the extent that it moves beyond traditional tribal loyalties, is essentially a feedback of Western ideas. The same, of course, is true of demands for self-determination and for one-man one-vote.

The process of political socialization may be subjected to tight centralized control. This is typical of totalitarian states, in which all phases of educational and cultural activity are supervised by the single party, which uses the state as a transmission belt (Stalin's term) for its ideology and program. Or it can be left to take place spontaneously, as occurs in constitutional-democratic states where the government is considered the servant rather than the master of society. Although publicly supported facilities such as schools, libraries, and

in some cases mass media participate in the process, there is sufficient diffusion of power to safeguard against ideological or intellectual dictatorship. Political socialization is a function of the general culture, and to the extent that the culture is free, socialization will be spontaneous and not necessarily supportive of existing structures. To give an example: without extreme repression by the KGB, political courts, and punitive mental hospitals, political socialization in Ukraine would very likely move in the direction of exercising Ukraine's constitutional right to secede from the USSR.

In the absence of governmental compulsion, agencies of political socialization, including families, clans, tribes, churches, associations and political parties as well as subordinate public authorities, tend to be representative of the people they serve. Hence, in a multi-ethnic society enjoying freedom of expression, citizens will generally be socialized as members of their ethnic groups. Loyalty to the territorial state will be conditioned at least in part by the extent to which that state and its leaders satisfy the rights and interests of the nationalities concerned. Even in the United States, ethnicity is surprisingly persistent, despite strong pressures of acculturation and assimilation (Parenti, 1967).

In creating political institutions for a developing multi-ethnic society, therefore, there are two principal options. One is to manage, or at least attempt to manage political socialization to fit the requirements of a desired

political structure--a unitary state or a territorial federation with constituent states not corresponding to tribal or ethnic-linguistic nations. This necessarily means a degree of cultural dictatorship the United States would hardly want to support. It also means placing the government in conflict with at least major sectors of the population: a situation conducive to deep-seated instability. The other option is to accept the ethnic plurality of the country as given and to design a political structure to fit and express this pluralism. As the latter option can be realized with less compulsion, it should also pay off in greater stability.

Consociation and Federalism

It follows from the foregoing that insofar as a political system is to rest on consent rather than compulsion, each coherent group within it must perceive that its basic needs can be fulfilled within the system. In the case of ethnic groups, proto-nations, and nations within multinational states, the primary need -- and a basic right -- of each group is for survival, including the preservation of language and culture (Van Dyke, 1978). Almost as important is the need for autonomy in managing the internal affairs of the group. Existentially less important, but strongly demanded in an age that emphasizes equality, is participation of the group in the decision making of the overall political system.

Whether formal arrangements are necessary to bind ethnic and national groups (including racial groups where race is a component of ethnicity) to a territorial political system depends on a number of factors, some measurable, some not.

To determine the multi-ethnicity of a territorial state, use may be made of the index of fragmentation developed by Rae and Taylor (1970, pp. 244ff.). Applied to a single unweighted factor, such as nominal membership in ethnic groups (or churches, or races) fragmentation is a figure ranging from 0 to 1 as follows:

$$F = \frac{\text{number of mixed pairs}}{\text{total number of pairs}}$$

Thus, if all the individuals in a population belonged to the same group, F would be zero. If each person belonged to a different group, F would be 1. The index may be compounded to account for a variety of integrators and differentiators -- the factors that hold a group together and set it apart from other groups -- and it can be weighted to deal with intensity of likenesses and differences. The compiling of complex indices of objective factors and the interpretation of results necessarily involve considerable subjective judgment.

If, however, a country shows a high index of ethnic fragmentation, and if this fragmentation is intensified by ideologies of national or ethnic particularism rather than being diluted by a tradition of territorial togetherness -- of which the "Americanism" that supposedly overrides race, creed, and national origin in the United States is typical -- then there is a prima facie case for institutions that recognize explicitly the existence and rights of ethnic groups. Arend Lijphart (1977, pp. 25-52) has developed the concept of "consociation" to describe such a structure meeting the needs of ethnic groups mentioned above. Consociational democracy, he states, may be defined in terms of four principles, all of which deviate from the Westminster model of majority rule: grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality, and

segmental autonomy.

In a grand coalition, which may or may not take the form of a coalition cabinet, leaders of all significant segments of society -- of ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic country -- cooperate in government. Largely homogeneous democracies, where cleavages involve competing political parties and interest groups linked by an overriding constitutional consensus, and where politics is a zero-sum game within clearly understood limits, grand coalitions appear in times of crisis -- as they did in Great Britain and Sweden during World War II. But in plural societies where the all-embracing consensus is weaker than the consensus within each group, the structure of society creates a permanent "crisis" calling for a long-term grand coalition.

Mutual veto means that although day-to-day decisions are made by majority vote, those affecting the vital interests of a minority may not be taken without that minority's consent. Minority veto, as Lijphart observes, is synonymous with John C. Calhoun's "concurrent majority," which gives each segment "the power of protecting itself, and places the rights and safety of each where only they can be securely placed, under its own guardianship. ..." (Calhoun, 1953, p. 28; cited, Lijphart, 1977, p. 37). Proportionality, another deviation from the winner-take-all principle of unrestrained majority rule, means that each segment is proportionately represented in policy-making bodies -- often with deliberate overrepresentation of minorities. It also means proportionate shares of civil-service appointments and of expenditures from public funds.

Segmental autonomy means that each segment of the total society -- that is each ethnic group or nationality in a multi-ethnic country -- enjoy full power to regulate and administer matters within the group's exclusive concern. Although Lijphart does not explicitly so state, his discussion implies that each ethnic group must be free to organize as a public-law body enjoying powers of taxation and proportional access to common financial resources. As applied to multicultural situations in Europe, segmental autonomy involves mainly the operation of schools at all levels, theaters, museums, and the like -- though it may also embrace welfare institutions and services. Lijphart admits frankly that consociational democracy "falls short of the democratic trinity of liberty, equality, and fraternity" (ibid., p. 48). But it may be the only workable model in a polity with clearly separate and potentially hostile population groups, where many decisions entail high stakes and where the zero-sum game is too dangerous to play.

The modus vivendi worked out by Ian Smith and his three black colleagues in the Rhodesian Transitional Government is partly consociational (Agreement, 1978). The four-man Executive Council is itself a Grand Coalition, as is the transitional cabinet composed of equal numbers of black and white ministers. Whether this coalition is sufficiently inclusive depends on two imponderables: the strength of the following the two externally based ZAPU and ZANU leaders Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe enjoy within Rhodesia, and whether these internal supporters of the Patriotic Front can be persuaded to join in peaceful transition to black majority rule -- with or without participation of Nkomo

and Mugabe themselves. A mutual brake if not a full mutual veto is provided, at least for ten years, by provisions reserving 28 seats in the 100-member parliament for whites and prohibiting these whites from forming a coalition with any single minority party in order to form a government (Agreement, A, 1, c through e). Proportionality is more an ultimate goal than an immediate prospect: black-white parity in the cabinet is a step toward it as is progressive Africanization in the civil service and the army. Segmental autonomy is the only factor wholly missing: the Agreement does not provide for organization or self-rule by ethnic groups. The largest of these is that of the Shona, who with 3.4 million (1969 census) constitute 68 percent of the Rhodesian population. The Ndebele, a Nguni tribe closely related to the Zulu, number 760,000, and there are 14 smaller ethnic-linguistic groups including the white Rhodesians. The Shona were formerly a collection of ethnic groups speaking dialects of the same Bantu language. Their loose cohesion enabled the Ndebele under King Mzilikazi to subjugate a number of Shona tribes between 1838 and 1840. Mzilikazi made a determined effort to convert the conquered Shona to the Ndebele language; young warriors drafted into his regiments had to learn it as part of their training. Half the Ndebele speakers today are descendants of people who underwent this forced language change. (Nelson, 1975, pp. 75-78)

The issue of ethnic autonomy does not appear to have been explicitly raised in Rhodesia. Ian Smith has always followed a territorial concept of politics and has justified discrimination on the basis of qualification rather than race. But

it is almost certain that Shona-Ndebele tension is at the root of dissension within the Patriotic Front. Neither the Ndebele Joshua Nkomo nor the Shona Robert Mugabe could bear to see the other enjoy a preponderance of power.

Federalism is also advanced as a structural solution to the problem of ethnic diversity -- Switzerland is the classical model. In persuading the Allies at the Paris Peace Conference to incorporate all Bohemia, including its 3.3 million Germans, in the new ethnic-linguistic state of Czecho-Slovakia, Dr. Beneš promised it would be "a sort of Switzerland" (note of May 20, 1919, quoted by Jaksch, 1963, p. 210). Although Carl J. Friedrich (1973) has used the term "corporate federalism" to indicate a system of ethnic autonomy akin to Lijphart's "consociation," the idea of federalism is generally associated with territorial decentralization. The concept is too familiar to require elaboration here, but it is important to note that in a federal system sovereignty -- at least in the operational sense -- is divided between the central government and the constituent states. The latter are states in the true sense of the term, exercising legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and not merely administrative provinces. Because a clear dividing line is needed between the powers of the central and regional governments, a federation always has a written constitution limiting the powers of the central government and reserving those of the constituent units, and the latter participate in the amending process. The legislature of a federal system usually has two houses, in one of which the constituent states are represented -- equally (United States, Switzerland, Australia) or by a formula favoring the

smaller units (Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Canada, and India)(Lijphart, 1978, p. 4).

A federation in a multi-ethnic country can be a consociation if

1. it is democratic in the liberal sense, with freedom of political association and expression;

2. the ethnic groups or nationalities are, at least for the most part, geographically concentrated; and

3. the territorial boundaries of the constituent states correspond, at least for the most part, to the settlement areas of ethnic groups. While some fragmentation within constituent states is permissible, it must be decisively less than that within the federation as a whole (adapted from Lijphart's analysis, 1978, pp. 6-7 and 11-12).

In this case, the constituent states, although defined by territorial boundaries, will in fact represent the respective ethnic groups or nationalities. Policy making at the central level will then be a process of reconciling ethnic group interests and finding common interests. This will be true whether or not the formal equality of ethnic components reflects the relationship between their respective economic, political, and military power, which may be highly asymmetrical.

Territorialism and its Consequences

American foreign policy with regard to the Third World, specifically but not only with regard to Africa, appears based on the ideological premise that all persons within a defined and named territory form or have the obligation to form a single

political community -- a concept that can be called territorialism (though there are other uses of that word). It reflects the rational territorial concept of the nation, the origins of which were discussed earlier. Territorialism does not fit the situation in most of Africa, where the settlement areas of tribal nations have no structural relation to the boundaries marked out by the European powers and perpetuated by the African successor states. Since the principle of absolute territorial democracy, without built-in safeguards for ethnic groups, is invoked in demanding the end of white hegemony in Rhodesia, South West Africa, and ultimately South Africa itself, it is desirable to know how the principle works in practice in the African situation.

In most multi-ethnic African states, politics is tribal politics. In Zambia, for instance, the reality behind President Kaunda's Widely acclaimed humanism was described by the British political scientist Michael Wright, whose findings this writer summarized in a review as follows:

> As in quite a few other African states, an ideology of "multi-racialism" is used in Zambia to cover up totalitarian domination by certain tribes which assume hegemony over the others. Kaunda's party, the UNIP, is dominated by the Bemba tribes -- about half the population of Zambia -- who discriminate systematically against the Lozi of Barotseland in the west of the country, as well as several smaller tribes. Minority religious sects, such as the Lumpa and Jehovah's Witnesses, are the victims of downright persecution, including the burning of churches, the beating of entire congregations, and the destruction of crops. ... (Glaser, 1973, p. 412)

The United National Independence Party (UNIP) Central Committee elections of August 1967 were fought along tribal lines, and the result upset a tribal and provincial balance Kaunda had

constructed. The Bemba political leader Simon Kapwepwe (who tried unsuccessfully to run against Kaunda in 1978) became Vice President at the expense of the Ngoni Reuben Kamanga, and two prominent Lozi ministers were demoted to lesser posts. In the 1968 general election, three ministers and three junior ministers running on the UNIP ticket were defeated in Barotse province because Lozi tribesmen refused to vote for that party -- even for Lozi candidates. President Kaunda forgot his earlier commitment to rise above tribalism and launched a campaign of intimidation against the Lozi. This was later reinforced by political party discrimination that culminated in proclamation of a one-party state in 1973 (for details, see Glaser and Possony, 1979, pp. 365-68).

In multitribal Tanzania, the policy followed by President Nyerere is not that of tribal hegemony or coalition but of building a modern African nation at the expense of tribal cultures in general. Through a centralized school system, his Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) is carrying out a program of forced linguistic conversion (Mhina, 1974). One solution to the problem of multi-ethnicity is therefore to abolish the ethnic groups. Whether Nyerere will succeed in doing so remains to be seen.

In neighboring Kenya, one-party politics cloaks a somewhat precarious balance among the major tribes: the Kikuyu (1,642,065), the Luo (1,148,335), the Luhya (1,086,409), and the Kamba (993,219), within a total population of 8,636,263 (1967). Kenyan nationalism was originally Kikuyu nationalism: the Mau Mau were bound by a Kikuyu tribal oath. In 1960, the

nationalist movement split into two parties: the Kenya African National Union (KANU), dominated by the Kikuyu and Luo leadership, and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), a coalition of smaller tribes. KADU demanded a quasi-federal regional structure as the price of agreeing to proceed with independence in 1963. A year after Uhuru, however, the KANU government emasculated the regional assemblies by recentralizing most of their powers (Gertzel, 1969, pp. 6-7).

Favoritism in the Kenyan civil service was aired in a 1966 debate; three-quarters of the District Commissioners were Kikuyus, and they tended to import others into the home districts of smaller tribes. The Kikuyu were also preferred in the central ministries -- except where the Minister happened to be a Luo. In that case, the entire staff down to the office boy was Luo, and business was conducted in that language (Kenya Hansard, October 14, 1966, cols. 870-900). President Kenyatta did not find it feasible to abolish tribalism in the central administration, but he did attempt to distribute patronage equitably among the various tribes. Fortunately, the intertribal power struggle that some predicted would follow Kenyatta's death did not materialize -- the tribal balance held firm. Vice President Daniel arap Moi, a member of the small Tugen tribe, gained enough support among Kikuyus and Luos to win the presidency against the ex-foreign minister and Kenyatta's personal physician Dr. Njoroge Mungai. It would appear that, despite the lack of any formal structure, Kenyan political accommodation follows the rules of consociation to some extent.

Forcing divergent ethnic groups into undifferentiated political structures has had relatively mild consequences in Zambia, Tanzania, and Kenya. Results have been more lethal in other African states. In Uganda, for instance, the misdeeds of dictator Idi Amin, have attracted world-wide publicity. Far less well known is the way inter-tribal tension within a unitary state sustains him in power.

The Baganda, the largest tribal nation in Uganda, originally wanted a separate kingdom under their Kabaka or king but were persuaded to accept a self-administering kingdom within a federalized Uganda. The Lango tribesman Dr. Milton Obote achieved a coalition of his Uganda People's Congress with the Kabaka's following, the Kabaka Yekka. Uganda became independent in 1962 with a central government of limited powers and four self-administering kingdoms; it became a republic the following year with the Kabaka as President and Dr. Obote as Prime Minister (Maitland-Jones, 1973, pp. 24, 52-53). But in 1966, when Parliament voted no-confidence in Obote, that scholar suspended the constitution, assumed dictatorial powers, and shortly thereafter forced the Kabaka to flee by bombarding his palace. Obote governed with the aid of the army and the police until Amin, partly to escape prosecution for corruption, overthrew him in 1971. Amin's first measure was to liquidate Obote's following among the Lango and Acholi tribes; four trusted subordinates saw personally to the shooting of 1800 officers and enlisted men belonging to these groups. Since then, opponents and potential opponents have been systematically eliminated. Amin's power base

is a coalition of Lugbara, Mahdi, and his own Kakwa tribe. Although the Baganda were initially pleased by Amin's takeover and his appointment of some of their members to high positions (Rubin and Weinstein, 1974, p. 25), they, particularly the Christians among them, are by no means immune from sudden death. Amin's assassination squads that roam the country in search of victims consist entirely of Moslem Nubians imported from Sudan. While Dr. Obote's estimate of 80,000 killed by Amin is probably high, he has obviously slain enough to make himself thousands of enemies.

Rwanda and Rurundi are two small countries where a 15-percent minority of Tutsi, a cattle-herding tribe known for their tall stature, had ruled for centuries over the peasant Hutu, whose position was akin to that of the serfs of medieval Europe. Shortly before the end of the Belgian mandate, the Hutu in Rwanda had demanded an end to this caste system, but the group surrounding the Mwami or Tutsi king replied that since their ancestral ruler, Kigwa, had come to throne by reducing the Hutu to a state of servitude, "there could be no basis for brotherhood between Hutu and Tutsi" (Lemarchand, 1970, p. 149). A violent Hutu revolt broke out in 1959: Many Tutsi chiefs were killed or forced to flee and the Belgians appointed Hutus to replace them. The Hutu party won the independence election of 1960; thousands of Tutsi, including most of their university students, were massacred during the next two years. An abortive Tutsi invasion from Burundi triggered renewed slaughter in which 12,000 Tutsi were killed and those who escaped fled to Burundi. In that country the Tutsi minority managed to retain control,

but a Hutu revolt broke out in April 1972. The rebel core, coming from Tanzania, proceeded to kill every Tutsi in sight and soon overran two provincial capitals. But the Burundi army put down the revolt and massive killings of Hutu ensued. From April to June some 80,000 Hutu were slain, mainly among those with more than primary education -- a campaign of aristocide wiped out the Hutu elite. The ruling Tutsi dare not grant the Hutu equal political rights lest they too be wiped out.

Another area of ethnic conflict is Sudan, where the Christian and animist black tribes of the South resisted efforts by the Khartoum government to impose the Moslem religion and the Arab language. There ensued a 17-year civil war in which deaths ran to hundreds of thousands, particularly on the southern side, since the Arab north enjoyed superior weapons and logistics. Half a million people scattered into the bush and some 180,000 took refuge in neighboring states. A compromise reached in Addis Ababa in 1972 created an autonomous southern region and put an official end to Khartoum's Arabization policy. Although some integration of the Sudanese central government and diplomatic service took place at the time and most of the refugees returned to their homes, there have since been unconfirmed reports of renewed rebellion. Similar struggles between black Africans and Arabs have occurred in Mauritania and in Chad -- where blacks and Arabs joined in a government of national union in 1978.

Nor is territorial federalism a solution for the problem of ethnic coexistence. It did not prevent bloody civil

war in Zaïre and Nigeria. In both cases peace was imposed by a victorious central government rather than emerging from negotiations. In connection with the Nigerian civil war it may be observed that although Biafra was proclaimed as the ethnic-linguistic state of the Ibo, the former Eastern Region was far from homogeneous. While struggling for their own self-determination the Ibo leadership neglected the needs of the smaller tribes -- the Efik, Ibibio, and Ejaw -- for political expression. These tribes therefore tended to favor the central government, whereas they might have supported a pluralistically structured Biafra.

Conflicts attributable to maladaptation of political structures to ethnic diversity are not, of course, limited to Africa. Chronic tension persists between blacks and East Indians in Guyana and Trinidad-Tobago, between Malays and Chinese in Malaysia, between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, and even between German- and French-speaking Swiss in Canton Bern. In the three latter cases, structural changes were made: Singapore, almost entirely a Chinese city, seceded from Malaysia; Sri Lanka and India reached agreement to return the majority of Tamils to the Indian mainland; and the French-speakers of Canton Bern were offered and accepted the opportunity to found a separate Canton Jura. Situations are worse where ethnic and religious divergences are compounded, as in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and Lebanon. In all these cases, the inclusive and cohesive political communities that would make territorial democracy workable are lacking.

Fitting Political Institutions to Specific Multi-Ethnic Situations

In finding the political structure most conducive to accommodation and cooperation among diverse ethnic groups within a country, it is necessary to analyze the specific facts of ethnicity. These include not only the number, size, and geographic distribution of ethnic groups -- data from which crude indexes of fragmentation for the country as a whole and for specific districts may be computed -- but also the ethnic integrators and differentiators: the factors that hold each group together and that separate them one from another.

Lemberg (1964, II, pp. 34-50) describes five integrators of nations: language, genetic background, cultural community, concept of history, and citizenship. All except the last are also applicable to ethnic groups. Lemberg's perspective accords with Kalijarvi's definition of a nation: "...a group of people connected not by legal but by psychological or cultural ties based on such influences as history, community of language, race, religion and customs." (1954, p. 74). To this enumeration, may be added religion, commitment to political ideologies or principles and, particularly in Third World context, relative state of socio-economic and cultural development. Each of these integrating and differentiating factors has a bearing on compatibility: the feasibility of sharing common political, social, and cultural institutions, common work places, and common residential areas. Compatibility

itself is differentiated: members of two ethnic groups or nationalities may be economically and culturally compatible, working in the same office or factory and enjoying the same concerts and theaters, and yet politically incompatible because the prevailing ideology of one group calls for a merger that would end the independent existence of the other. It will be remembered that the right to survive is the fundamental right of all ethnic groups, and that survival implies the right of self-definition.

It follows that a number of specific judgments must be made as to which institutions and amenities can be shared and which must be duplicated for particular groups or combinations thereof. A presumption may be stated in favor of common institutions wherever possible: resources are limited and "separate but equal" facilities are seldom really equal. There is no longer a place for petty apartheid: people who ride the same buses and trains, eat in the same restaurants, and stay in the same hotels do not thereby risk their ethnic identities. And in any case, price differentials assure socio-economic compatibilty: people do not, for instance, buy tickets to symphony concerts or operas unless they have reached the appropriate economic and cultural level. If this sounds like an admission that stratification will persist in Third World countries for some time, this is probably true. In view of the relative shortage of investment capital and the problem of bridging in decades the steps of development that took centuries in Europe,

instant equality could hardly be expected. But the stratification will no longer be racial: the managerial class in the Third World will become increasingly inter-ethnic and international except where misguided chauvinists insist on exclusion of foreigners or people belonging to the "wrong" ethnic or racial groups. This qualification does not preclude incentives for encouraging training and employment of domestic talent rather than expatriates. But denial of economic rights to foreigners and confiscation of their property has always proved dysfunctional. A case in point is Zaïre, which is still suffering the consequences of wiping out its expatriate middle class before an African middle class was ready to take its place.

Functional analysis of the various integrators and differentiators cannot be undertaken here. (For a short treatment see Glaser and Possony, 1979, pp. 122-31; for a fuller discussion see Lemberg, 1964, loc. cit.) Two observations are in order. The greater the number of factors differentiating groups, and the greater the intensity with which they are perceived as elements of personal and group identity, the greater the social distance and the corresponding need for separate political expression. Americans, with their democratic tradition, may dislike the notion of accepting social distance as a fact of life rather than demanding its abolition. But it must be remembered that distance operates horizontally as well as vertically: acknowledging differentness does not imply judgment of superiority or inferiority. The other point is that the integrating and differentiating value of each factor varies with time and place, as

prevailing ideologies change (Lemberg, 1974). Thus in the seventeenth century, German Catholics and Protestants could not bear to live in the same neighborhood. Such close coexistence is a non-problem in Germany today, though still a problem in Northern Ireland.

In extreme cases of socio-political distance, outright partition of a country may be the preferred solution where geographically possible. But there are countries and regions where distance is great but not unbridgeable, where interethnic tension results from lack of accommodation interdependence makes a common market mandatory. Such is the situation in Southern Africa today. It is typified by continued South African port traffic through Maputo in Marxist-ruled Mozambique and by President Kaunda's reopening of the Zambian border with Rhodesia. Evidently, economic need prevails over ideological commitment. A dismantling of the international and interracial Southern African economy, especially within the Rand currency area, would mean rapid impoverishment for all concerned. In such cases, where coexistence is a vital need of highly divergent groups, some form of federalism is indicated.

But what of the country where nationalities are not sorted out into compact settlement areas but live intermingled, in enclaves and exclaves, and often literally next door to each other? Such was the situation in the Habsburg Empire before World War I. Karl Ronner, a highly original political thinker and a staunch upholder of Austro-Hungarian unity, recognized

that territorial federalism would only partly solve the problem of interethnic relations -- even if the historic Crown Lands were replaced by autonomous regions matching ethnic settlement areas as closely as possible, as the Social Democrats had proposed in their Brno Program of 1899. That same year he wrote of constituting the nations -- the ethnic peoples wherever they might live -- as legal personalities. Each nation would govern and administer its own affairs, all together their common affairs. "In short, the personality principle and not the territorial principle" (cited, Hannak, 1965, p. 89).

As Renner developed the concept he called personal autonomy in his later writings, the Austrian federation would be divided into two different kinds of constituent units. There would be territorial constituent states of the traditional type, each corresponding to a natural geographic region and charged with maintaining public order and with economic functions. But there would also be an autonomous cultural body for each nation, providing services to its members without regard to territorial boundaries. This may be called two-track federalism, since each citizen of the federation would be subject to dual jurisdiction: territorial and national.

More specifically, Renner advocated the total separation of national from territorial organization. Each nationality should form a public-law cultural union, with the power of personal taxation and authority to establish primary and secondary schools as well as institutions of higher learning

in all parts of the Empire -- wherever members of the respective nation might live (Renner, 1906, p. 239).

Significantly, both Lenin and Stalin--whom Lenin had sent to Austria to study the nationality question--rejected Renner's personal autonomy "as a dangerous kind of bourgeois nationalism subtly disguised in socialist phrases" (Kann, 1951, p. 244). They preferred the purely territorial decentralization of the Brno Program. Kann (loc. cit.) speculates that they feared that Renner's plan would make possible a peaceful solution of social and cultural problems, thereby short-circuiting the forces of revolution.

Renner's concept of personal autonomy was given a partial trial in Moravia, where a law of 1905 introduced universal suffrage and divided voters into Czech and German national registers, which balloted separately in electing the Diet and local councils. Within the Land government, each nation managed its separate schools and cultural institutions. Renner's scheme was also applied in Estonia, where a 1925 law gave minority groups of 3,000 or more cultural autonomy. Each minority could establish a Cultural Council with taxing power, and could operate public and private schools in its own language as well as theaters, libraries, and other cultural institutions (Lijphart, 1978).

A combination of territorial and personal autonomy seems a workable structure for multi-ethnic developing countries, particularly those where diverse peoples are scattered and intermingled and where divergent stages of development are reflected

in social distance. Both are manifestly the case in Southern Africa. Many members of Bantu-speaking nations have left their traditional homelands and are settled in the white area, where some have lived for generations. Their political representation thus stands high on the agenda of any structural planning. At the same time, socio-economic asymmetry is reflected in mutual suspicion bordering on hostility, thus ruling out unitary democracy for a long time to come.

The white South Africans, like the German-Austrians and Magyars in the old Danubian Empire, are perceived as exploiting their hegemonial position for their own benefit and to the detriment of everyone else. Members of the hegemonial nation see their existence threatened by the others -- especially those of lesser development and higher birth rates -- and are tempted to equate hegemony with survival. The point is not the virtue of symmetrical compared with unbalanced power-sharing systems, but rather the fact that a viable multinational body politic did not exist in Austria-Hungary and does not exist in Southern Africa today. The same may be said of Zaire, Nigeria, Indonesia, the Philippines (at least in the south), and all countries where there are ethnic nations who are struggling for political expression and who perceive their territorial governments as at least partially foreign.

To sum up: the political needs of a multi-ethnic country are not fulfilled by unitary territorial democracy, and often not even by territorial federalism. In designing political institutions for countries containing ethnic groups having

distinct identities, the opportunity must be provided for each group to organize politically and to administer its own affairs, with an equitable share of public resources. Where nationalities are intermingled, the principle of personal autonomy should be invoked, enabling the organs of each nationality to provide education, cultural facilities, and other services meeting specific needs, wherever members of the nationality may live. Where political institutions are shaped to fit the existing ethnic structure, political socialization can build on traditional groups, mobilizing them to reach higher levels of cohesion, rather than destroying the social fabric as the first step in nation building.

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